Lutheran Dichotomies: State-Church

Introduction

In analyzing the effects of Lutheran theology on the mission of the church, the obvious issue is the relationship between belief and action. Accordingly, the discussion of the two kingdom (state-church) dichotomy with which the present essay is concerned falls under the scope of Christian ethics. A brief consideration of ethical principles is necessary prior to any analysis.

As explained extensively in Van Til’s Christian Theistic Ethics, Christian ethics seeks to evaluate the will’s moral status by making judgments with respect to the purpose, standard, and motive of human behavior. The purpose is the external goal or highest good (summum bonum) to which an action tends; the standard is the law or norm that governs the means to the end, and the motive is the internal compelling power which drives the action. Accordingly, to be considered good, an action must be driven toward a proper end through the use of proper means by a proper motive. For the Christian, the goal of ethics is the eschatological realization of God’s Kingdom; the standard is the Law of God, and the motive is a grateful heart springing from true faith. To clarify the interrelationships among these particulars. Van Til invokes the analogy of a journey in which the goal, standard, and motive of Christian ethics correspond to the destination, road, and attitude of the driver, respectively (Van Til, 1-4).

In reference to the above categories, the state-church issue relates to both the goal and the standard of Christian ethics. First, the state-church relations are intimately tied to the nature-grace dichotomy. This fact alone suffices to diminish the goal and standard of Lutheran civil ethics since it fractures the view of life. Additionally, since the state is particularly the realm of Law, and the church is the realm of Gospel, the Law-Gospel dichotomy overlays the nature-grace dichotomy, providing reciprocal reinforcement which augments the previous effects. Before proceeding further, then, it is necessary to review these subjects.

Nature-Grace

With respect to the nature-grace dichotomy, the Lutheran position can best be seen by noting its relation Roman Catholicism, on the one hand, and Calvinism, on the other. At the time of the Reformation, Thomistic philosophy prevailed in Roman Catholicism. Because of this philosophy, reality was viewed in terms of a common chain of being with God on the top and the material world below. The tension between these extremes was felt in man, who consisted of a rational soul and an irrational, material body. Since man’s soul was pure being, it was held to be unaffected by the Fall and limited by its finitude alone. Man’s evil lusts were therefore attributed to his material body which consisted of a mixture of being and non-being. Because the church was considered to be the incarnation of God on earth, the realm of grace (the church) occupied an intermediate place on the scale, sitting above the realm of nature at each point. Moreover, since knowledge was considered correlative with being, knowledge was held to increase with the position on the scale. Thus, with the realm of grace above the realm of nature at each point, the church was thought to supplement and perfect the truths of natural reason available to all men. Yet, since the natural realm occupied a legitimate place on the scale, the deductions of natural reason were considered valid within their own realm and thus granted a limited autonomy. Because man’s soul was held to be unaffected by the Fall, man’s thinking was held to be limited by his finitude alone, and not sin. Moreover, the sinful lusts, in turn, were attributed to man’s material nature which occupied a lower place on the scale. Consequently, the problems of knowledge and ethics were considered to be metaphysical. On this basis, the relation between the two realms was supposed to be one of a friendly continuum with the church supplementing the natural realm in all fields of human endeavor. Since the primary distinction was in the vertical direction, no horizontal barriers were placed across the zones of human activity, resulting in a catholic (universal) organizing principle.

In Calvinism, by contrast, Augustinianism was the guiding theology. Man was considered to be totally depraved in all aspects of his being, in mind no less than body. While his knowledge was, of course, limited by his finitude, sin was the major problem. it was not so much that man was ignorant, but rather that he willfully chose to suppress the truth (Rom. 1:18). Man’s noetic problem, then, was caused by his ethical problem. Consequently, he was totally dependent on the grace, whether common or saving, to overcome his resistance to true knowledge. Moreover, since the ontological distinction between God and man was absolute, they could share no community in being as in the Thomistic concept. As a result, man had to deal with God directly, not the church. The implication was that man was confronted with the claims of divine revelation in all fields of human activity, and no autonomy was accorded to man’s natural reason. Since the primary problems of knowledge and behavior were ethical (qualitative), no horizontal barriers were erected between the various zones of human activity, resulting, once again, in a catholic organizing principle.

In Lutheranism, however, the pressing needs of the Reformation dictated an initial focus on the church. Consequently, while the Augustinian principle was introduced, its area of application was limited, allowing a defacto Thomism to prevail in the rest of life. (By defacto Thomism it is meant to imply the naturalistic fruits thereof, stripped of their metaphysical underpinnings. Certainly Luther did not incorporate the chain of being concept.) Moreover, as a result of Luther’s antipathy toward ecclesiastical control, the church was removed from above the natural sphere and placed along side. With separate organizing principles in each sphere, then, a horizontal dichotomy developed, fracturing the view of life. Thus, in Lutheranism the primary distinction is neither metaphysical nor ethical, but rather epistemological and institutional. As a result, the church is separated from the world, giving the latter, particularly the state, a relatively autonomous existence. Obviously, such a division affects the goal and standard of Christian ethics.

Law-Gospel

The second problem, bearing a reciprocal relation to the first, is the Law-Gospel dichotomy. While the Law is affirmed in Lutheran theology, Luther’s largely anthropological focus causes the Law to be viewed in terms of its effects on fallen man rather than its relation to God’s character. Consequently, the Law is viewed negatively, with its primary purpose being condemnation. While it is true that the Law condemns, its primary focus must be seen in relation to God’s character. Because the Law derives from God, it is determined by His holy character and is thus good. Moreover, its direction is also good since it points toward God’s goodness and away from evil, in its essence, then, the Law is a norm for man and is a constructive tool of dominion because it is in harmony with God’s creation. Thus, while it is true that the Law condemns, this must be seen as an effect contingent on the nature of fallen man and not basic to the nature of the Law. After all, it is precisely because of its normativity that the Law functions as a mirror, and it is due to man’s sinful nature that he is condemned, looking into it.

Due to the anthropological focus in Lutheranism, however, the condemnation of the Law is heavily emphasized, giving the Law a negative cast, and putting it in a false opposition to the Gospel. Since this opposition, in turn, reinforces the negative perception, the ethical standard, though implicitly affirmed, is obscured. Additionally, because the state is considered the realm of Law, the Law-Gospel dichotomy overlays the nature-grace dichotomy, producing a reciprocally reinforcing effect that wedges the church from the state. Attempts to confront state abuses are thus doubly doomed.

Confessional Writings

Having considered the nature-grace and Law-Gospel dichotomies at some length, it remains to examine their impingement on state-church relations. As a first step, it is necessary to consult the Lutheran confessional writings (Apology of the Augsburg Confession, The Book of Concord, 222,223,225,226):

The writings of our theologians have profitably illumined this whole question of the distinction between Christ’s kingdom and a political kingdom. Christ’s kingdom is spiritual; it is the knowledge of God in the heart, the fear of God, and faith, the beginning of eternal righteousness and eternal life. At the same time it lets us make outward use of the legitimate political ordinances of the nation in which we live, just as it lets us make use of medicine or architecture, food or drink or. air. The Gospel does not introduce any new laws about the civil estate, but commands us to obey the existing laws, whether they were formulated by heathen or by others, and in this obedience to practice love. It was mad of Carlstadt to try to impose on us the judicial law of Moses (emphasis added) (Apology, XVI, 2, 3).

Although we concede to free will the liberty and ability to do the outward works of the law, we do not ascribe to it the spiritual capacity for true fear of God, true faith in God, true knowledge and trust that God considers, hears, and forgives us. These are the real works of the first table, which the human heart cannot perform without the Holy Spirit....

Therefore we may profitably distinguish between civil righteousness and spiritual righteousness, attributing the former to the free will and the latter to the operation of the Holy Spirit in the regenerate (emphasis added). This safeguards outward discipline, because all men ought to know that God requires this civil righteousness and that, to some extent, we can achieve it. At the same time it shows the difference between human righteousness and spiritual righteousness, between philosophical teaching and the teaching of the Holy Spirit; and it points out the need for the Holy Spirit. (Apology, XVIII, 7, 9)

From these writings several facts are evident. First, Christ’s kingdom is “spiritualized” and thus severed from the world and the state. Consistent with this division, it is said that the Holy Spirit is needed only for spiritual righteousness and not for civil righteousness which can be attained by man’s “free will” and “philosophical teaching.” Moreover, natural law is assumed to be compatible with the second table, since man’s inability extends to the first table alone. Yet, while this compatibility would therefore seem to provide a basis for the application of the second table to the state, it is also said that the Gospel introduces no new laws for the state. Rather, Christians are commanded to obey the existing laws of the state even if they have been formulated by heathen. (That gradual reformation provides a legitimate alternative to both disobedience and sinful sloth is entirely missed.) Finally, Carlstadt is criticized for imposing the judicial Law of Moses, implying that only heathen laws are above reproach. There seems to be a lack of concord in the Book of Concord.

Natural Law vs. God’s Law

From these considerations it can be seen that the nature-grace and Law-Gospel dichotomies impinge on the state-church relations, resulting in a depreciation of Biblical Law and a consequent exaltation of human reason in the civil sphere. As a result, the unity of God’s Law and the depravity of man are both minimized. However, since the entire Law derives from God, it is a unit, making disobedience at any point a religious act. Moreover, since man’s depravity is fundamentally religious, he will suppress the entire Law in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18), the second table no less than the first. Consequently, it is a mistake to assume that fallen man will conform himself to God’s Law through natural reason apart from common or saving grace. As a consequence, heathen approximations of Biblical Law must be attributed to dispensations of God’s common grace by which they are constrained in spite of themselves to acknowledge the very standard written in their hearts. Thus, heathen laws must be viewed as mere approximations of the original creation standard (God’s Law) from which they deviate to greater or lesser degrees. Consequently, these legal systems must be confronted with the concrete claims of God’s Law and gradually reformed. To the extent that deviant systems are validated through natural law, however, God is tempted, and the basis of reform is removed. After all, if natural reason is the key, Christians can contribute nothing unique.

Hermeneutics and Casuistry

Additionally, with respect to the judicial Law of Moses, a hermeneutical problem becomes evident from the confessional writings. This problem relates to the unity of the covenant. On the Reformed view, the Old and New Testaments are considered to be parts of a unified covenant of grace, differing only in their accidental details (Turretin, 192-240). This position is referred to as covenant theology and stresses a high level of continuity between the two. At the opposite extreme, however, is Dispensationalism, which views the history of redemption in a fractured sense, and thus perceives a radical discontinuity between the Old and New Testaments. From these distinctions it can be seen that the Reformed embrace virtually the entire Law, while radical Dispensationalists reject even the Decalogue. With respect to these positions, however, the Lutheran view is intermediate, perceiving essential differences between the Old and New Testaments while recognizing Law and Gospel elements in both. Consequently, while Lutherans adhere to the Decalogue, they reject the case law.

That this is a mistake can be seen from an examination of Ex. 20:1-23:19. The Decalogue and its case laws are a unit and bear a reciprocal interpretative relationship to one another. This result, of course, derives from God’s Triune nature which makes the one-and-many equally ultimate and mutually conditioning. Thus, particulars and universals interrelate with the particulars illustrating the universals, and the universals grouping the particulars. Neither can be abstracted from the other without destroying the meaning of each. Universals without particulars are empty, and particulars without universals are brute. Thus, broad legal statements such as the Decalogue are rendered meaningless apart from a system of casuistry (case law) which enables their implementation. After all, to be useful the Law must be applied in particular, concrete cases. However, when the case laws are stripped from the Decalogue, the universals are rendered empty, allowing only the most superficial and childish considerations to be applied. Moreover, since the depreciation of Biblical Law becomes inevitable, reason is exalted in the realm of the state. Both trends are evident in the thought of Lutheran scholar Helmut Thielicke (Thielicke, 351):

One might note in passing that this question is discussed by Luther in his doctrine of the two kingdoms. The relative autonomy of world events and the implied independence of values are recognized here. Thus the commandments of God are not a direct norm for these events. They have to be transposed into the schema of relatively autonomous occurrence. Hence they are not to be applied with casuistic directness to this sphere. Since this sphere has its own immanent laws, reason is called into play. A politician has to do what is rational and he must observe the immanent laws of political events.

Thus, when one rejects a Biblical casuistry, a rational casuistry fills the void. Both of these aspects can be seen in Luther’s thought (Brandt, 119, 127):

For no matter how good and equitable the laws are, they all make an exception in the case of necessity, in the face of which they cannot insist upon being strictly enforced. Therefore, a prince must have the law as firmly in hand as the sword, and determine in his own mind when and where the law is to be applied strictly or with moderation, so that law may prevail at all times and in all cases, and reason may be the highest law and the master of all administration of law (Luther, “Temporal Authority”).

But whether one he a Christian or not a Christian, you should decide the question of restitution as follows. If the debtor is poor and unable to make restitution, and the other party is not poor, then you should let the law of love prevail and acquit the debtor; for according to the law of love the other party is in any event obliged to relinquish the debt and, if necessary, to give him something besides. But if the debtor is not poor, then have him restore as much as he can, whether it be all, a half, a third, or a fourth of it, provided that you leave him enough to assure a house, food, and clothing for himself, his wife, and his children. This much you would owe him in any case, if you could afford it; so much the less ought you to take it away now, since you do not need it and he cannot get along without it (Luther, “Temporal Authority”).

In contrast to Luther’s advice, however, the Bible conditions restitution on the amount of the debt, and in no case is irresponsible behavior rewarded by giving the perpetrator “something besides.” What Luther’s example makes clear is that the absence of a Biblical casuistry leads to situation ethics (Fletcher, 17-57). “There is no alternative but that of theonomy and autonomy” (VanTil, 134).

Practical Implications

As the previous examples clearly demonstrate, the dichotomies of Lutheran thought impinge on state-church relations, frustrating any unified approach to the state. As a result of the nature-grace dichotomy, the view of life is fractured, removing the natural realm from the Lutheran sumum bonum and eliminating a coherent standard. This dualism is epistemological. Second, since the state is considered the realm of Law, the Law-Gospel dichotomy reinforces the nature-grace dichotomy, wedging the church from the state. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that these distinctions are relative, not absolute. While Lutheranism fails to challenge the natural realm epistemologically, it nevertheless affirms it metaphysically, recognizing God’s call in legitimate vocations. Moreover, in spite of the Law-Gospel antithesis, the validity of the Law is still maintained. Since the normativity of the Law is implicit in every use, it remains in the system.

Thus, LCMS President, Dr. A. L. Barry, spoke out boldly in relation to the abortion provisions in President Clinton’s national health-care proposal (Reporter, 8):

It is neither the purpose of the church, nor its responsibility, to dictate to the state what should or should not be done by way of a national health-care program. This is a matter on which the Scriptures are silent. We leave this decision in the hands of those elected to fulfill the role given by God to the government. We as Christian citizens may hold a variety of opinions on the issue of national health care. What is absolutely clear, however, is that abortion is wrong. The state must not condone or tolerate the death of the most innocent of its citizens, our unborn children [emphasis added]. It is for this reason that our Synod has consistently spoken out against abortion, calling on our members to make their voices heard.

As you will read elsewhere in this issue of the Reporter, on behalf of our Synod, I sent a letter to members of both houses of the Congress and President Clinton clearly stating our Synod’s opposition to abortion as part of a national health-care program. Our Synod opposes any legislation which would pay for abortion as a basic health benefit. / would encourage our congregational leaders to make the laity aware of the impending threat of abortion coverage in a national health-care program. Our members should be encouraged to be in contact with the appropriate government officials to make their feelings known, [emphasis added]

This is clearly a bold call to action (thank you, Dr. Barry), and can easily be argued from those portions of the Lutheran Confessions cited herein. The problem is that the confessional writings give mixed signals, as is evident from the above quotation. While abortion is clearly condemned, stealing in the form of socialized medicine is exempted from criticism due to state-church distinctions and the supposed silence of the Scriptures. But the Scriptures aren’t silent; they contain sufficient principles with regard to taxation and theft to make a reasonable deduction. To make such deductions, however, is the business of casuistry which becomes an impossibility when the case laws are denied. Finally, given that Thielicke and Barry are at opposite ends of the liberal-conservative spectrum, the commonality in their thinking must be seen to derive from a fundamental structure of Lutheran theology and not from incidental factors. Civil considerations are problematic in Lutheran thought.

References

1. Walther I . Brandt, Luther’s Works: Christian in Society II (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1962).
2. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press).
3. Reporter (St. Louis: LCMS [a publication for church workers]).
4. Theodore G. Tappert, ed.. The Book of Concord (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959)
5. Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith, v. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974).
6. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology (Phillipsburg NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1994).
7. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic Ethics (Phillipsburg NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1980).